
In Chilé, They Went Private 16 Years Ago
by José Piñera
José Piñera was Chilés minister of labor and social security
from 1980 until 1983. He is currently president of the International Center
for Pension Reform and co-chairman of the Cato Institute Project on Social Security
Privatization.
The United States is not the first, or the only, country to face
a crisis in its government-run retirement system. All over the globe, old-fashioned
pay-as-you-go social security and pension programs are going broke, facing the
hard lessons of demographics.
Among the first countries to enact fundamental pension reform
was my nation of Chilé, the first country in the Western Hemisphere to
adopt a social security system, in 1925, 10 years before the United States.
But by 1980, when I was Chilé's secretary of labor and social security,
its social security system faced the same financial problems as the U.S. system
faces today.
Rather than make the usual short-term fixes of raising taxes
or cutting benefits Chilé (population, 14.5 million) decided on a revolutionary
approach: a privately administered national system of individually owned, privately
invested retirement accounts.
The success of Chilé's venture into privatization can provide
a valuable example for the United States. After 16 years, Chilé's experiment
has proven itself. Pension benefits in the private system already are 50 to
100 percent higher (adjusted for inflation) than they were in the state-run
system. The resources administered by the private pension funds amount to $30
billion, or around 43 percent of GDP as of 1997. Because it has improved the
functioning of both the capital and the labor markets, Social Security privatization
has been one of the key reforms that has pushed the growth rate of the economy
upward from the historical 3 percent a year to 7 percent on average during the
last 12 years. The Chiléan savings rate has increased to 25 percent of
GDP, and the unemployment rate has decreased to around 5 percent since the reform
was undertaken.
Under Chilé's privatized system, which is monitored and
regulated by the government, neither the worker nor the employer pays a social
security tax to the state. Nor does the worker collect a government-funded pension.
Instead, during his working life, he has 10 percent of his wages automatically
deposited by his employer each month in his own, individual account. The contribution
is not taxed. His pension level is determined by the amount of money he accumulates
during the number of years he is working.
A worker may contribute an additional 10 percent of his wages
each month, which is also pre-tax, as a form of voluntary savings. Generally,
a worker will contribute more than 10 percent of his salary if he wants to retire
early or obtain a higher pension.
A worker chooses one of about 14 private Pension Fund Administration
companies to manage his account. Each company operates the equivalent of a mutual
fund that invests in stocks and bonds. Investment decisions are made by the
managing company. Government regulation sets only maximum percentage limits
both for specific types of investments and for the overall mix of the portfolio.
In the spirit of the reform, those regulations are to he reduced with the passage
of time and as the companies gain experience.
Workers are free to change from one investment company to another.
For that reason, there is competition among the companies to provide a higher
return on investment, better customer service or a lower commission. Each worker
is given a passbook for his account; every three months he receives a statement
informing him of how much money has accumulated and how his investment fund
has performed. The account bears the worker's name, is his property, and will
be used to pay his old age pension (with a provision for survivors' benefits).
The government retains some involvement in the system, via a
safety net financed from general revenues for those who have not accumulated
enough. A worker who has contributed for at least 20 years but whose pension
fund, when he reaches retirement age, is below the legally defined "minimum
pension," receives a pension from the state once his account has been depleted.
What should be stressed here is that no one is defined as "poor"
in advance. Only after his working life has ended, and his account has been
depleted, does a poor pensioner receive a government subsidy. (Those without
20 years of contributions can apply for a welfare pension at a much lower level).
Upon retiring, a worker may choose one of two general payout
options. Under one option, a retiree may use the capital in his account to purchase
an annuity from any private life insurance company. Alternatively, a retiree
may leave his funds in the account and make pre-arranged withdrawals, subject
to limits based on the life expectancy of the retiree and his dependents.
In the latter case, if he dies, the remaining funds in his account
form a part of his estate. In both cases, he can withdraw as a lump sum the
capital in excess of that needed to obtain an annuity or programmed withdrawal
equal to 70 percent of his last wages.
In moving to this new system, we set three basic rules. The government
guaranteed people already receiving a pension that it would be unaffected by
the reform. That was important because it would be unfair to the elderly to
change their benefits or expectations.
Every worker already contributing to the pay-as-you-go system
was given the choice of staying in that system or moving to the new system Those
who left the old system were given recognition bonds that were deposited in
their accounts. Those bonds reflected the rights the workers had already acquired
in the pay-as-you-go system.
All new entrants to the labor force were required to enter the
new system. The door was dosed to the pay-as-you-go system because it was unsustainable.
This requirement ensured the complete end of the old system once the last worker
who remained in it reaches retirement age (from then on, and during a limited
period of time, the government has only to pay pensions to retirees of the old
system). That is important, because the most effective way to reduce the size
of government is to end programs completely, not simply scale them back so that
a new government may revive them at a later date.
Since the system began to operate on May, 1, 1981, the average
real return on investment has been 12 percent per year (three times higher than
the anticipated yield of 4 percent). Of couse, the annual yield has shown the
oscillations that are intrinsic to the free market -- ranging from minus 3 percent
to plus 30 percent in real terms -- but the important yield is the average one
over the long term.
Pensions under the new system have been significantly higher
than under the old, state-administered system, which required a total payroll
tax of about 25 percent. The typical retiree is receiving a benefit equal to
nearly 80 percent of his average annual income over the last 10 years of his
working life -- almost double the percentage available in the U.S. social security
system. The law requires that the benefit represent at least 70 percent of the
recipient's last monthly salary.
The new pension system, therefore, has made a significant contribution
to the reduction of poverty by increasing the size and certainty of old age,
survivors and disability pensions and by the indirect, but very powerful, effect
of promoting economic growth and employment.
What would happen if the United States followed Chilé's
example? The benefits to the U.S. economy would he substantial. Harvard economics
professor Martin Feldstein estimates that "the combination of the improved
labor market incentives and the higher real return on savings (of moving to
a fully funded Social Security system) has a net present value gain of $10 trillion
to $20 trillion, an amount equivalent to 5 percent of each future year's GDP
forever."
And, most important, today's young workers would be assured that
when they retire they will be able to do so with dignity and security.
This article originally appeared in The Washington Post on March 22, 1998.
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