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Whither Social Security? Transition it, then Retire It
by William A. Niskanen
William A. Niskanen is chairman of the Cato Institute and a former economic advisor to President Reagan.
Social Security, the largest and most popular federal program,
is now 63 years old and should soon be retired. For Social Security is an intergenerational
Ponzi scheme, a tax on those now working to pay for those now retired, and the
bills are now coming due.
The first Social Security tax was 2 percent on earnings up to
$3,000 a year. The current Social Security tax in 12.4 percent on earnings up
to $72,600 a year -- of which 10.7 percentage points is for retirement income
and 1.7 percentage points is for disability insurance. In addition, workers
pay a 2.9 percent tax on all earnings to finance Part A of Medicare.
The first Social Security recipient was a hardy lady named Ida
Mae Fuller who paid a total of $44 in payroll tax and, by living to the age
of 100, received a total of $21,000 in benefits; for most of those who have
since retired, Social Security has also been a bargain. For workers born in
the past forty years, however, the average real (inflation-adjusted) rate of
return on their social security taxes will be about 1.4 percent, lower than
the current real yield on Treasury bills. And for different reasons, blacks,
the second worker in two-worker households, and high earning workers will receive
an even lower return.
And that is if Social Security pays all of the benefits that
it has promised. The current payroll tax, however, will only finance about 75
percent of the promised benefits by the year 2030. The primary reason for this
ominous portent is that the number of workers per beneficiary is expected to
decline from the current ratio of 3.3 to a ratio less than 2.0 by that year
with the retirement of the baby boomers.
One way or another, a business-as-usual approach to Social Security
will require some combination of a reduction in benefits or other federal spending,
an increase in the payroll tax or some other federal tax, or an even larger
federal debt burden on our grandchildren. All because federal politicians chose
to finance Social Security on a pay-as-you-go basis more than 60 years ago.
The manager of a private or state pension fund would go to jail for the same
behavior.
Tinkering with Social Security is no longer enough. Reducing
future benefits or increasing the payroll tax would lead to a negative real
return to today's young workers. The only type of pension program that is demographically
stable in the long run is a prefunded plan in which each generation pays for
their own retirement. This point is now generally recognized, even in that island
of unreality called Washington. The challenge is to design a transition plan
from the current pay-as-you-go system to a prefunded system while maintaining
the benefits of those who are already retired or nearing retirement. And that
is now the primary focus of the Social Security debate.
This debate, fortunately, has been pulled forward more than any
of us anticipated, largely by President Clinton's commitment to submit his own
proposal on Social Security this winter. President Clinton, to his credit, was
also correct to urge Congress not to commit the pending federal budget surplus
to other ends until this issue is sorted out. Financing the transition to a
stable prefunded private retirement program is surely more important than the
mishmash of spending increases and tax cuts recently considered by Congress.
The Social Security plan that Clinton outlined in his recent State of the Union
Address, however, is unfortunately not a serious proposal:
- About 50 percent of the projected unified budget surplus over the next
15 years would be committed to reducing the federal debt owed to the public.
This may have better effects on the economy than many other proposed uses
of the surplus but would have no direct effect on Social Security. By sleight-of-hand,
Clinton would increase the federal debt owed to the Social Security Trust
Fund by twice this amount, claiming that this would extend the solvency
of this mythical trust fund to the year 2055, but this left-handed bookkeeping
would have no substantive effect on anything. The issue is not double counting
but phony accounting; two times nothing is still nothing.
- About 12 percent of the projected surplus would finance a small new complicated
IRA. The federal government would put a small fixed amount into all these
Universal Savings Accounts and would then augment individual deposits to
these accounts on an income-tested basis. This measure would also have no
effect on Social Security.
- Another 12 percent of the projected surplus would be invested in private
securities to be held by the Social Security Trust Fund. Clinton proposed
a system designed to protect these investments from political pressure,
but the record of similar systems is not encouraging. Many state and local
pension funds and some national provident funds have been manipulated for
political objectives, reducing the rate of return to these funds. From early
in the Clinton administration, the Department of Labor has tried to pressure
private pension fund to invest in politically targeted investments. Although
this component of the Clinton plan has been the focus of most early criticism,
this is the only component that would have any effect, albeit minuscule,
on the future funding of Social Security.
This plan, apparently assembled by some wordsmith with a stapler,
is not a serious plan, and there is no reason for Congress to give it serious
attention. My guess is that this plan, like the 1993 health care proposal, will
never reach a floor vote.
In that case, where should Congress go from here? The worst response
to Clinton's failure to submit a serious proposal would be to act as if Social
Security is not a serious issue; this would trigger a frenzy of down-payment
spending and junk tax cuts that would fritter away the budget surplus. A better
alternative would be to do nothing; approve a tight budget, go home, and let
the surplus reduce the federal debt until there is a sufficient consensus to
resolve the Social Security issue. The best alternative is to recognize that
the projected surplus is a rare opportunity to resolve the major long-term fiscal
issues. And the most important fiscal challenge is to transform Social Security
from an unsustainable pay-as-you-go government pension into a sustainable system
of prefunded private retirement accounts.
The Cato Institute, fortunately, has been studying Social Security
for over 20 years, a program that was regarded as the third rail of American
politics for most of that period. The general provisions of the several transition
plans that make the most sense to us are the following:
- The benefits of those who are currently retired would be fully guaranteed.
Anything less would be morally wrong and politically stupid.
- All current workers would have the choice to stay in Social Security
or to move to a new system of private retirement accounts. For those who
stay in Social Security, the age for full benefits could be slowly increased,
maybe by 2 months a year, up to age 70.
- Those who choose the private retirement account would receive a recognition
bond equal to the cumulative value, including interest, on the Social Security
taxes they have already paid. In addition, they would put some part of their
payroll tax in one or more government-authorized portfolios of private stocks
and bonds.
The sum of the recognition bonds and the accumulating private portfolios
would make most workers better off, primarily because of the substantially
higher return on private equities. Over the past 70 years, for example,
the average real return on U.S. corporate equities was 7.7 percent, and
there was no 30 year period in which the real return was less than 4 percent.
Since the average real return on Social Security is now only 1.4 percent,
most workers would be better off even if only half of the Social Security
tax were diverted to private accounts. Moreover, for those who die prematurely,
the recognition bonds and accumulated private portfolios would be part of
the person's estate, compared to the complete loss of these accumulated
payments under Social Security.
- All new workers would be in the private retirement system.
- The transition cost would be financed by some combination of the following:
- the projected surplus on the unified budget,
- the part of the Social Security tax that is retained by the government,
- the higher tax revenues from the increased private investment and
earnings, and
- some increase in the federal debt that would be repaid when the benefits
payments to the remaining Social Security recipients decline.
- The federal government would retain five important roles:
- set the payroll tax rate and the share that may be diverted to private
accounts,
- maintain the benefits of those who are currently retired or choose
to stay in the Social Security system,
- maintain a safety net financed from general revenues for those who,
for whatever reason, do not accumulate a sufficient private account
for a minimally adequate retirement annuity,
- authorize the private funds into which some part of the payroll tax
may be diverted. At such time that a person has accumulated assets of
a specified level, any additional retirement saving may be put into
any investment, and
- regulate the rate at which an individual can draw down the principle
of his or her retirement account or require that individual to buy an
annuity of a specified amount.
That's about it. The primary political issues involve the share
of the payroll tax that would be diverted to private accounts, whether the age
for full retirement should be gradually increased, the level of the safety net,
and how much the government should regulate the authorized private portfolios.
Most of these problems, of course, would be larger if Congress fritters away
the projected budget surplus on less important matters. We have a brief window
of opportunity to sort out this issue, and the sooner the better.
This article originally appeared in The Colorado Springs Gazette, October 16, 1998.
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